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Recent Developments 
Degren v. State: 
Failure to Prevent the Sexual Abuse of a Child, When It Is Reasonably Possible to 
Act, Qualifies As Sexual Abuse Under Maryland's Child Abuse Statute 
I n a unanimous decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that an adult responsible for the 
supervision of a child is guilty of sexual 
abuse when they fail to prevent the 
sexual molestation of the child. 
Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 722 
A.2d 887 (1999). The defendant's 
conviction for child abuse was upheld 
in Degren because of her failure to 
stop or report the child abuse of a 
minor under her supervision when it 
was reasonably possible for her to act. 
In so holding, the court of appeals 
refined the child abuse statute and 
made it clear that a supervising adult 
has an affirmative duty to prevent the 
abuse of children under their care. 
Sharon Degren ("Degren") and 
the mother of twelve-year -old Jennifer 
B. ("Jennifer") agreed that Jennifer 
would stay at Degren's house, under 
Degren'ssupervision. Id at405, 722 
A.2d at 889. During her stay, Jennifer 
was sexually abused by Degren's 
husband, Nick Degren (''Nick''), and 
his friend, Richard Dobsha ("Rick"). 
Id at 406-07, 722 A.2d at 890. In 
some instances, Degren was present 
in the same room when Jennifer was 
sexually abused, occasionally 
watching the sexual abuse from the 
comer of the bed. Id Nevertheless, 
Degren did not attempt to prevent the 
sexual abuse, or contact the 
authorities. Id. Degren was 
subsequently convicted by ajury in 
the Circuit Court for Charles County 
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of four counts of child abuse, and 
sentenced to four concurrent ten-year 
sentences. Id at 404, 722 A.2d at 
889. On appeal, the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the 
conviction, and the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland granted certiorari to 
address the issue of whether the child 
abuse statute includes an act of 
omission or failure to prevent abuse. 
Id 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by interpreting Maryland's 
child abuse statute to determine 
whether the failure to prevent sexual 
abuse of a minor was an act that 
constituted child abuse. Id. at 408, 
722 A.2d at 891 (citing MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 27, § 35C (1996)). The 
relevant part of the statute states that 
"a parent or other person who has 
permanent or temporary care or 
responsibility for the supervision of a 
child ... who causes the abuse to the 
child is guilty of a felony." Id at 408, 
722 A.2d at 891 (quoting MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 27, § 35C(b)(1) (1996)). 
The court interpreted the 
meaning and scope of the statute by 
reviewing cases where it had applied 
the statute. Id at 409, 722 A.2d at 
891. The court noted one case in 
which it held a mother guilty of 
involuntary manslaughter for her failure 
to protect her infant from repeated 
abuse by her boyfriend. Id. at 409-
10, 722 A.2d at 891-92 (citing 
Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 353, 
164A.2d467,474 (1960)). Yetin 
another case, Pope v. State, the 
court found a woman not guilty of 
child abuse for her failure to stop the 
mother from physically abusing her 
child while they were in the 
defendant's house. Id. at 415-16, 
722 A.2d at 894-95 (citing Pope v. 
State, 284 Md. 309, 318-20,396 
A.2d 1054, 1060-62 (1979)). The 
instant case was distinguished from 
Pope, because in Pope, the court 
found that there was no mutual 
consent for the defendant to have 
supervisory responsibility for the 
child. Id Degren, on the other hand, 
had agreed with Jennifer's mother to 
care for Jennifer. Id The court found 
that its rulings in these cases provided 
a basis for convicting a person for 
failure to prevent sexual abuse. Id. 
To clarify that Degren's failure 
to act qualified as sexual abuse, the 
court next addressed the plain 
meaning of the child abuse statute. 
Id. at 418, 722 A.2d at 896. The 
statute defmes sexual abuse as "any 
act that involves sexual molestation 
or exploitation of a child." Id (quoting 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 
35C(a)(6)(i) (1996)). Degren's 
contention on appeal was that her 
actions did not qualify as sexual abuse 
because she did not act in furtherance 
of the abuse. Id This contention 
prompted the court to define "act" 
and "involves" as they relate to the 
statute. Id The court considered 
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outside sources because the definition 
of "act" is not in the statute. Id. 
According to Black's Law Dictionary 
"an omission or failure to act may 
constitute an act for the purpose of 
criminal laws." Id. (quoting BLACK's 
LAW DICTIONARY 25 (6thed. 1990)). 
Furthermore, the court pointed out 
that "act" is normally construed to 
include omissions from a duty to act. 
Id. 
The court stated that the word 
"involves," which modifies "act" in the 
statute, "connotes a broad sense of 
inclusion, such as an act relating to 
sexual molestation or exploitation." 
Id. In further support of the statutory 
usage of "involves," the court 
reviewed Merriam-Webster' s 
Collegiate Dictionary and found that 
"involves" means "to have an effect 
on." Id. (quoting MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 
617). Thus, according to the court, 
"involves" serves as an extender 
beyond sexual molestation or 
exploitation to include "something 
done by the accused that relates to 
the molestation or exploitation." Id. 
Moving beyond the issue of 
statutory construction, the court 
considered the legislative intent behind 
the statute. Id. at 419-20, 722 A.2d 
at 896-97. The court found the 
legislative intent clear because the 
introductory paragraph and purpose 
clause of the statute stated that the 
purpose of the statute was to protect 
children. Id. (citing MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 27, § 35C (1996)). Furthermore, 
the court considered a 1974 
amendment to the statute, which 
added sexual abuse as a form of child 
abuse. Id. The purpose of this 
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extension was to expand the definition 
of child abuse. Id. Thus, the court 
concluded, the definition of child 
abuse was intended to be open in 
application, making Degren' s 
contention that omissions were not 
acts contradictory to the legislative 
intent. Id. 
Next, Degren argued that 
because the "failure to act" language 
was not added to the sexual abuse 
provision, the statute was only 
applicable for failure to intervene 
during the physical abuse of a minor. 
Id. at 421, 722 A.2d at 897. The 
court rejected this argument and 
stated that the definition of abuse does 
not require physical injury for criminal 
penalties, and that the 1973 
amendment broadened coverage of 
the entire statute to include failure to 
act, regardless of whether the abuse 
is physical or sexual. Id. After 
considering these factors, the court 
held that "the definition itself 
encompasses what petitioner actually 
did: the affirmative acts of watching 
and failing to intervene in the rape." 
Id. at 425, 722 A.2d at 899. 
By allowing the conviction for 
sexual abuse for an omission to act, 
the court of appeals has extended the 
coverage of the child abuse statute. 
This praiseworthy decision will allow 
the prosecution of individuals who do 
not directly participate in abuse, but 
who may reasonably prevent the 
abuse and who have a responsibility 
or duty to the child. This decision will 
help to further extend penalties for 
child abuse and thus provide a means 
of prosecuting more participants in 
this insidious crime. 
